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Abstract 
Two studies examined how lexical information contained in 
words affects people’s category representations. Some words 
are lexically suggestive regarding the taxonomic position of 
their referent (e.g., bumblebee, starfish). However, this 
information differs from language to language (e.g., in Dutch 
the equivalent words hold no taxonomic information: 
hommel, vlinder). Three language groups, Dutch, English, and 
Indonesian speakers, were tested in similarity and typicality 
judgment tasks. The results show that the lexical information 
affects only the users of the language (e.g., Dutch speakers 
rated Dutch-informative items, both in similarity and 
typicality tasks, higher than English and Indonesian speakers). 
Results are discussed in light of theories of concept 
representation and the language relativity hypothesis. 
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Introduction 
In concept research, the meaning of a word is generally 
related to the properties of the (category of) objects it refers 
to. These properties cover a broad range, such as physical, 
contextual and taxonomic properties. This information is 
activated when people have need of the word meaning, for 
instance when they have to interpret the word in a sentence, 
or make concept-dependent judgements, such as similarity 
(how similar are salmon and trout) or categorization 
decisions (is this novel object a fish?). A number of theories 
propose that categorization follows a feature-based 
approach, meaning that people tend to put objects in the 
same category the more properties they have in common 
(e.g., Clark, 1973; Nelson, 1974; Mervis, 1987). For 
instance, an object that grows in soil and has branches and 
leaves is called a tree. Consequently, all objects that share 
the same features will be called a tree as well.  
Language, however, is generally not considered merely a 
system of signifiers that map on classes of objects with 
certain (physical) properties. Indeed, it also entails a 
particular way of carving up the world and manners of 
thinking about reality, subtly encoding cultural knowledge, 
and metaphors that describe ways of viewing natural 
phenomena (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). It is often 
claimed that, when learning a language, one does not only 
learn what the different words in a language refer to, but 
also these more subtle aspects. In other words, learning a 
particular language may have particular effects on thinking 
about and perceiving the world (e.g., Casasanto, 2016; 
Lucy, 2014).  
The idea that language shapes thought and perception has 
some interesting consequences, which become tangible 
when considering the myriad of languages that can be found 
in the world. According to language relativity, as two 
languages are structurally different, their respective speakers 
should differ in how they think, act and perceive in 
objectively similar situations. This hypothesis has been 
examined and confirmed in a number of cognitive domains. 
The effects on cognition of particular manners of 
classification have been documented in domains such as 
color (e.g., Thierry, Athanasopoulos, Wiggett, Dering, & 
Kuipers, 2009), causation (e.g., Fausey & Boroditsky 2011), 
and space and motion (e.g., Slobin, 1996). Also, it has been 
shown that grammatical categories such as gender and tense 
have effects on cognitive tasks (e.g., Boroditsky, Schmidt, 
& Phillips, 2003), and language specific metaphors that 
describe abstract domains such as time, musical pitch and 
mathematical and number terminology have been shown 
influential in cognitive tasks in these domains (e.g., 
Casasanto, 2008; Dolscheid, Shayan, Majid,  & Casasanto, 
2013). 
Considering the evidence available at the moment, the 
question is not so much whether language can influence 
thought, but how, in which domains and to what extent this 
is the case. In the present study, we examine whether the 
representation of categories in a taxonomically structured 
domain are under influence of the vocabulary that a 
language provides for the domains. In some cases, the name 
that a language provides for a category of objects sometimes 
holds information regarding its position in the taxonomic 
structure. For example sunflower is a type of flower, a 
bumblebee is closely related to bees, a goldfish is a type of 
fish and a blackbird is a type of bird. Clearly, in English, the 
names are more than just arbitrary signifiers, containing 
what we will refer to as “lexical information”: Information 
regarding the referent of a word that follows from the word 
itself, generally because the name is a combination of 
constituents of which at least one has a meaning in the 
language. The obvious question from a language relativistic 
point of view then is whether the availability of lexical 
information in a name influences the representation of the 
category it refers to. To the extent that languages differ in 
terms of lexical information, one may find representational 
differences for everyday categories such as bumblebees or 
cauliflowers1. From the perspective of the dominant theories 
in concept representation (e.g., exemplar theory, Smith & 
Medin, 1981; family resemblance, Rosch & Mervis, 1975; 
prototype theory, Hampton, 1995), we do not expect 
category labels to have any influence in how the category is 
represented. Although some theories consider the labels to 
be features that matter (e.g., the rational model of 
categorization; Anderson, 1991), the labels are considered 
arbitrary, and thus their meaning is not taken into account. 
To examine whether a word’s lexical information influences 
the representation of the object category it refers to, we look 
at objects for which one language has a head noun that is 
informative as to the object’s position in a broader 
taxonomy, whereas the equivalent in another language does 
not entail such information. The word bumblebee, for 
instance, is informative in English, but not in Dutch, where 
no reference to bee is made in the word (hommel) or in 
Bahasa (i.e., the Indonesian language; kumbang). 
Conversely, inktvis (squid) is suggestive in Dutch (i.e., the 
word vis in Dutch means fish) but not in English (squid) or 
Bahasa (cumi-cumi). 
If the representation of object categories is influenced by 
lexical information, we expect that people’s judgments 
regarding the objects will subtly vary across language 
groups in a systematic way, particularly when the judgments 
rely on the representations of the categories. For example, as 
starfish in English contains a category suggestion, but not in 
Dutch, we expect English participants to judge a starfish to 
be more similar to a goldfish than Dutch participants, as 
starfish in Dutch does not hold the same category 
suggestion (zeester). Moreover, we expect English 
participants to judge starfish as more typical for the fish 
category than Dutch participants. Similarity and typicality 
are fundamental notions in concept representation research, 
and directly related to how people represent classes of 
objects. As such, they form a perfect arena to test whether 
lexical information influences representation. 
Study 1: Similarity  
In the first study, we examined how lexical information 
included in object names can influence people’s judgments 
of similarity between two objects that share lexical category 
information in their name (e.g., the Dutch pair walvis and 
inktvis; in English, respectively, whale and squid) and 
whether the three language groups, English, Dutch, and 
Indonesian speakers, give higher similarity ratings for pairs 
of items that are lexically informative in their own language. 
                                                          
1 Obviously, a cauliflower is not a flower. Some names provide 
useful taxonomic information, but sometimes the information can 
be misleading. Another example: the word whale in Dutch (walvis) 
wrongly implies that the animal belongs in the fish category. We 
will consider both cases. 
Method 
Participants Sixty English speakers (44 females and 16 
males, mean age: 21 years and 10 months), 74 Dutch 
speakers (59 females and 15 males, mean age: 18 years and 
3 months), and 60 Indonesian speakers (33 females and 27 
males, mean age: 24 years and 6 months) were tested. Two 
Indonesian participants were excluded from the analyses as 
there was no variability in their answers. The Dutch 
speakers were students who got credits in exchange for 
participation, the Indonesian participants were students who 
live and study in Indonesia, and the English speakers were 
recruited online using Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
 
Material2 A list of 70 questions was presented in a web 
survey. Each question contained a pair of words that shared 
the same lexical information in one of the three languages. 
In 16 word pairs the words were informative in Dutch but 
not in English nor in Bahasa (e.g., wasbeer and beer 
[raccoon and bear]; aardappel and sinaasappel [potato and 
orange]), 16 word pairs were informative in Bahasa but not 
in English nor in Dutch (e.g., ikan hiu and ikan pari [shark 
and stingrays]; burung hantu and burung kakaktua [owl and 
cockatoo]), and 16 word pairs were informative in English  
(e.g., bumblebee and bee; catfish and jellyfish), but not in 
Dutch nor Bahasa. As fillers, eight word pairs were 
informative in all three languages and 14 word pairs were 
uninformative in all the three languages. 
 
Procedure Dutch and Indonesian participants were given a 
link to an online survey, whereas the English speakers 
participated via Mechanical Turk. In the survey, each word 
pair was presented in the format: “How similar are X and 
Y?”. Participants answered on a 10-point rating scale 
ranging from 1 (not at all similar) to 10 (extremely similar). 
The survey took about 5 to 7 minutes. All items were 
translated into the three languages and all three groups of 
participants received the survey in their own languages 
Thus, with the exception of the filler items, items that were 
informative in one language were uninformative in the other 
two languages. Each participant was randomly assigned to 
one of four randomized orders of the items sets. 
Results and Discussion 
First, the consistency of the similarity judgments within 
each language group was computed using the split-half 
method combined with the Spearman-Brown formula. The 
reliability estimates for English, Dutch, and Indonesian 
speakers were, respectively, .80, .89, and .90, indicating a 
high agreement among participants of the same language 
group in the similarity judgment task. Next, we computed 
average similarity scores by first calculating by-participant 
                                                          
2 In a pilot study, different participants from the three language 
groups were asked to judge the familiarity of all the objects’ 
names on a 10-point scale. The results revealed that participants 
were relatively familiar with all items. 
conditional means and then collapsing across participants 
(see the upper panel of Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: Averaged raw (upper panel) and z-transformed 
(lower panel) similarity scores in each condition with 95% 
confidence intervals. The z-transformed values reflect the 
effect of lexical informativity, controlled for differences 
between language groups and item groups. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that people’s similarity 
judgments are influenced by the lexical information in the 
objects’ names, mixed effect analyses were performed on 
the similarity judgment scores. In the analyses, the language 
group (English, Dutch, and Indonesian speakers) and the 
language informativity were included as fixed effects, 
whereas participants and items were included as random 
effects such that a maximal random structure was created 
(Barr, Levy, Scheepers, & Tilly, 2013). The crucial test of 
the linguistic relativity hypothesis concerns the interaction 
between language group and language informativity: If 
lexical information influences the similarity judgments, we 
expect that two categories are judged more similar by 
speakers of the language in which the categories’ names are 
informative. To test for this interaction, a model that 
includes the interaction term was compared with a model 
that does not. The analyses were carried out in R (version 
3.1.2) using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2014). As predicted, the analyses revealed a 
significant language group × language informativity 
interaction (χ²(4) = 34.49, p < .001), suggesting that 
similarity judgments can be influenced by lexical 
information. However, the interpretation of the interaction is 
not that straightforward, because baseline similarity scores 
differed in the three language groups. This is best 
exemplified by a separate analyses of the filler data, which 
showed a strong effect of language group (χ²(2) = 26.60, p < 
.001). Remember, fillers were either uninformative or 
informative in all three languages, so this finding entails that 
the three language groups have diverging baselines.     
To aid the interpretation of the language group × language 
informativity interaction, we transformed the similarities 
into z-scores for every participant separately, after which 
by-participant conditional means were calculated. 
Collapsing across participants then yields the average 
similarity scores shown in the lower panel of Figure 1 (some 
are negative as a result of the by-participant z-
transformation). Figure 1 suggests that items informative in 
a certain language receive relatively higher similarity ratings 
from the speakers of that language. Additional contrast 
analyses performed on the untransformed similarity data 
confirmed this (β = 0.86, SE = 0.26, Z = 3.25, p = .001, for 
Bahasa; β = 1.17, SE = 0.25, Z = 4.66, p < .001, for Dutch; 
and β = 1.07, SE = 0.23, Z = 4.73, p < .001, for English)3. 
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that each 
language group judges similarity higher for item pairs that 
are lexically informative in their own language.  
In general, it is assumed that people judge similarity 
based on features that objects have in common. However, 
this study shows that lexical information may also affect 
similarity judgments between two objects, even when it 
concerns objects that are rather perceptual in nature. Note 
that the participants were most likely not aware of the 
purpose of the study, as nothing in the instructions hinted at 
the research question of interest, and the item list contained 
a relatively large number of fillers. This finding suggests 
that the particular language, and the implicit cultural 
knowledge it carries, can influence people’s judgments. 
Study 2: Typicality  
In Study 2, we examine whether lexical information that is 
included in objects’ names could affect people’s typicality 
judgments. Typicality refers to the graded membership 
structure of concepts, and is considered a crucial variable in 
natural language concept research (see, e.g., Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). Similar to Study 1, items that are informative 
either in English, Dutch or Bahasa were presented in order 
to investigate whether language users rate typicality higher 
for words that are informative in their own language.  
                                                          
3 The statistical model is the same as in the previous analyses, 
except that Helmert coding was used to extract the relevant 
comparisons. Furthermore, to obtain p-values, we treated the t-
statistic as a z-statistic following Barr and colleagues (2013, p. 
266).The data and the scripts of the mixed effects analyses can be 
found on osf.io/tfqhw. 
Method 
Participants Sixty one English speakers (46 females and 15 
males, mean age: 22 years and 4.5 months), 60 Dutch 
speakers (48 females and 12 males, mean age: 18 years and 
5 months), and 67 Indonesian speakers (41 females and 25 
males, mean age: 24 years and 8 months) participated in the 
second study. One participant was excluded since she was 
originally from Malaysia and spoke Malay as her mother 
tongue. None of them participated in Study 1, nor were they 
aware of the purpose of this study. The Dutch speakers were 
students who got credits in exchange for participation, the 
Indonesian participants were students who live and study in 
Indonesia, and the English speakers were recruited online 
using Mechanical Turk. 
 
Materials A list of 46 questions was presented to the 
participants in a website survey. Six items were most 
informative in English (e.g., ladybird, eggplant, jellyfish), 
six items were most informative in Dutch (e.g., kikkervisje, 
inktvis, stinkdier [tadpole, squid, skunk]), and another six 
items were most informative in Bahasa (e.g., ikan hiu, 
burung hantu, burung kakaktua [shark, owl, cockatoo]). The 
remaining items were fillers, consisting of eight items that 
were informative in all three languages (English, Dutch, and 
Bahasa), and 20 items that were not informative in any of 
the three languages. 
 
Procedure All questions were of the following format: 
“How typical is x for the category of X?”. All informative 
items (x) were paired with the category name (X) that was 
included in the objects’ name. For example: “How typical is 
a goldfish for the category of fish?”. Participants were asked 
to answer on a 10-point scale rating, ranging for 1 
(extremely atypical) to 10 (extremely typical). The survey 
took about 3 to 5 minutes. All participants were tested in 
their own language and received one out of three sets of 
questions, which only differed in the order of the items. 
Results and Discussion 
The consistency of the typicality judgments in each 
language group was computed using the same method as in 
Study 1 (i.e., split-half method combined with the 
Spearman-Brown formula). The results were, for English, 
Dutch, and Indonesian speakers, respectively, .91, .91, and 
.97. These results indicate a very high consistency between 
subjects in each language group (see the upper panel of 
Figure 2 for the average typicality scores in each condition). 
Mixed effects analyses were then performed on the 
typicality judgment scores in order to investigate whether 
lexical information included in objects’ names could affect 
people’s typicality judgments. The analyses were run in the 
exact same manner as in Study 1. Again, the effect of 
interest in this study, the interaction between language 
group and language informativity, was statistically 
significant (χ²(4) = 13.08, p = .011). 
 
 
Figure 2: Averaged raw (upper panel) and z-transformed 
(lower panel) typicality scores in each condition with 95% 
confidence intervals. The z-transformed values reflect the 
effect of lexical informativity, controlled for differences 
between language groups and item groups. 
 
As in Study 1, the interpretation of the interaction gets 
clouded by cross-cultural differences in baseline (typicality) 
judgements. More specifically, analyses of the filler data 
showed a main effect of language group once again (χ²(2) = 
7.96, p = .019). Analogous to Study 1, we first transformed 
the typicality judgments into z-scores per participant, then 
we calculated by-participant conditional means, and finally 
we collapsed across participants to obtain the average 
typicality scores shown in the lower panel of Figure 2. The 
pattern of results looks very similar to those displayed in 
Figure 1. That is, items informative in a certain language 
receive relatively higher typicality ratings from the speakers 
of that language. Additional contrast analyses performed on 
the untransformed typicality data are in line with this, 
although the effect did not reach statistical significance for 
Bahasa (β = 0.89, SE = 0.57, Z = 1.54, p = .123, for Bahasa; 
β = 1.19, SE = 0.49, Z = 2.42, p = .015, for Dutch; and β = 
1.52, SE = 0.43, Z = 3.57, p < .001, for English). 
The results of Study 2 suggest that in all three language 
groups, participants rated typicality higher for items that 
were informative in their respective languages. Similar to 
Study 1, these results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
people are influenced by lexical information in giving 
typicality judgments, even if sometimes the lexical 
information provided is misleading (e.g., starfish and inktvis 
[squid] rated as more typical members of category fish for, 
respectively, English and Dutch speakers). Again, it seems 
that not only non-lexical features are considered when 
making these judgments – as is the general assumption of 
models of concept representation – but also suggestive 
information that is available in the linguistic name of an 
object. 
General Discussion 
Two studies were conducted to investigate the influence of 
lexical information on semantic tasks related to taxonomic 
concept representation. In Study 1, evidence was found that 
participants rated similarity higher for item pairs that were 
informative in their language, as well as in Study 2, where 
the participants judged typicality higher when the items’ 
name was suggestive of a particular taxonomic position in 
their mother tongue. Interestingly, these findings suggest 
that language has some influence on how categories are 
represented simply by means of the particular names that are 
used. Not only does this finding have consequences for 
models of concept representation and categorization, it is 
also interesting to consider it in light of the discussion 
concerning the influence language can have on thought. 
More than features? 
Both the similarity and typicality judgment task showed that 
even if the information contained in the objects’ names was 
misleading, people are tempted to use this information to 
categorize the object.  While this is an interesting finding as 
such, the obvious question is which cognitive processes 
underlie the observed effect of lexical information. Broadly 
speaking, the effect can be driven either by the 
representation that is influenced by the label, or the response 
processes underlying the judgment. 
At a representational level, it is possible that some 
features of the informative constituent of the label are 
automatically transferred to the representation of the 
category the label refers to. For example, the representation 
of ‘star fish’ in English speakers may automatically include 
some features of fish, by virtue of the label. When making a 
judgment of similarity or typicality, these features, although 
not experientially acquired, will make the categories more 
similar, or typical: a starfish will be considered more typical 
of fish and more similar to goldfish because of these 
transferred features. Alternatively, it may be merely because 
of the label. According to the rational model of 
categorization, labels are just another feature, without any 
special status. Thus, according to this approach, a similarity 
or typicality judgment also relies on the label, and shared 
labels or partly shared labels are expected to influence the 
judgment. 
The effect could also reside at the response level. Given 
that in both experiments, informative trials presented 
participants with two labels that share a constituent, it is 
possible that participants were influenced by the mere 
commonality in the labels. This explanation would imply 
that whatever the label, independent of it being informative 
or not, commonality between labels will influence 
judgments of typicality and similarity (for example, this 
would imply that English speakers judge a beer and a 
beehive more similar than Dutch speakers). While this is not 
our preferred interpretation, it cannot be refuted on the basis 
of the two experiments presented here. 
To examine this hypothesis, an additional ongoing study 
is conducted using pairs of items in which an item with 
lexical information is paired with an item that is considered 
to be a typical member of the category mentioned in the 
name of the first item (e.g., salmon and jellyfish and 
salmon). As in the present studies, critical items are only 
informative in one language. In this way, the idea that 
people make an inference about the likely relation between 
the words (e.g., share the ending ‘-fish’) can be controlled. 
Importantly, while we cannot conclude to either 
explanation, our results do not in any way contradict the 
basic idea that similarity drives categorization, nor that 
perceptual, contextual and relational features are important. 
In general, people do categorize objects based on these 
features and then compare them with the other members or 
the prototype of the category. However, relying on features 
– in the traditional sense – may not tell the complete story. 
As demonstrated in Djalal, Ameel, Heyman, and Storms 
(2016), there is no clear-cut correspondence between the 
generated features and the prediction of category 
membership, and thus it should not come as a surprise that 
sometimes information of a different nature is relied upon.  
Language shapes thought? 
The present study provides evidence for language specific 
characteristics being influential in two fundamental 
cognitive tasks that have been extensively shown to rely on 
concept representation. The leap to concluding that the 
labels in a language can influence meanings should not be 
made without care, however. For one, as explained in the 
previous section, the effect may reside at the response level.  
Here, we consider another possible explanation that points 
to a particularly subtle way of how language can shape 
behaviour in certain tasks. Perhaps the effect of label 
informativity depends on uncertainty. When people cannot 
form a sufficiently detailed image of the object a word is 
referring to, they may rely on other sources of information, 
one of which is the knowledge encoded in the labels of the 
language. For example, when people are uncertain as to 
whether a squid is a fish (a boundary case at least for some 
people), Dutch speakers may indeed rely on the “cultural 
knowledge” present in their language (in which the word for 
squid makes reference to fish) as a source of information, 
whereas English and Bahasa speakers do not have this 
knowledge available. While most objects used in the present 
studies were relatively familiar to participants, this 
interpretation requires further examination.  
While not a mere response effect, relying on language in 
this way is presumably not what is understood when 
theorizing about language and though. However, the 
question is whether the potential relation with an 
individual’s knowledge would make the observed effect less 
interesting. Perhaps one of the most basic ways in which 
culture, and language, are influential in a person’s behaviour 
and thought, is the mere fact that she can rely on knowledge 
that is encoded in the culture, without the need for first-hand 
experience. 
In sum, the present findings in the domain of concept 
representation are consistent with the (abstract) hypothesis 
that language shapes thought, but more importantly, they 
point to a number of hypotheses as to the cognitive 
processes or representational differences involved in the 
behavioural effects. 
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